Control (CAC) problems with nonlinearly-constrained feasibility regions and two classes of users are derived. The policies are restricted to the class of coordinate-convex policies. Two kinds of structural properties of the optimal policies and their robustness with respect to changes of the feasibility region are investigated: 1) general properties not depending on the revenue ratio associated with the two classes of users and 2) more specific properties depending on such a ratio. The results allow one to narrow the search for the optimal policies to a suitable subset of the set of coordinate-convex policies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Call Admission Control (CAe) represents an important mechanism to guarantee specific Quality of Service (QoS) requirements. CAC determines when to accept or reject a new connection, flow, or call request (depending on which technol ogy is used), thus limiting the load that enters a network. This is accomplished by verifying if enough resources are available to satisfy the performance requirements of a new call without penalizing the ones already in progress.
A basic model for CAC is the stochastic knapsack [1] .
In this model, one has C units of resources and K classes of users. The calls from each class k E {l, ... , K} arrive according to a Poisson process. If accepted by the system, each of them occupies bk units of resources, which are released at the end of the call. The simplest CAC policy, known as Complete Sharing (CS) , consists in accepting a call whenever the system has sufficient resources. However CS may lead to a monopolistic use of resources by certain classes of users, thus to a poor resource utilization [2, Section Ill] . This motivates the interest in different admission policies (see the references in [3, Section 7. 1]).
In general, finding optimal policies for the stochastic knap sack model is a difficult combinatorial optimization problem [4, Chapter 4] . The knowledge of structural properties of the optimal policies is useful to simplify its solution or at least to find good suboptimal policies. For instance, for two classes of users and an objective given by a weighted sum of per-class average revenues, structural properties were derived in [I] for the optimal policies belonging to the class of coordinate convex policies. Coordinate-convex policies form a large class of CAC policies characterized by a relatively simple structure and interesting properties, such as their product-form steady state distribution [4, Chapter 4] and bounds on the per-class blocking probabilities [5] . When the service rates and resource requirements do not depend on the customer's class (single service), the optimal CAC policy is not coordinate-convex and is called trunk reservation ( [6] , [7] ). For such a case, [8] and [9] provide recursive formulas to evaluate the performance of any trunk reservation policy and an iterative search algorithm to find optimal policies. They exploit such an algorithm to find coordinate optimal threshold policies (a particular kind of coordinate-convex policies) in multiservice systems (for which different classes may have different and heterogeneous resource requirements and mean service times).
The stochastic knapsack model can be extended by in troducing the concept of feasibility region [10, pp. 46-49] . This is a region o'FR in the call space where given QoS requirements in terms of packet-Ioss/packet-delay probability are statistically guaranteed. When some form of statistical multiplexing is used, often this implies that the linear constraint U:= kEK nkbk � C} for the stochastic knapsack model is replaced by a more complicated constraint for the feasibility region, e.g. of the form L kEK (3k(nk) � C [4, p. 212] , where the (3k (-) are nonlinear functions (see Figure 1) .
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The following is a summary of our contributions. For CAC problems with nonlinearly-constrained feasibility regions OFR and two classes of users, we provide
• some general structural properties holding for any optimal coordinate-convex policy (Subsection III-A);
• more specific structural properties dependent on the rev enue ratio associated with the two classes of users;
• simulation results (Section IV).
In doing so, we extend some results of [1] to nonlinearly constrained feasibility regions; see Subsections III-A and III-B. All the proofs are deferred to Section VI.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
In this section, we summarize the CAC problem studied in [1], which will be extended in Section III to a nonlinearly constrained feasibility region OFR.
The state of the CAC system in [1] is described by a 2-dimensional vector n, whose component nk, k = 1, 2, represents the number of connections from users of class k that have been accepted by the system and are currently in progress. For each class k, the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed with mean value I/Ak(nk) and the holding times of accepted connections are independent and identically distributed (U.d.) with mean value 1/ f.." k. The CAC system accepts or rejects a request of connection according to a coordinate-convex policy. Here we recall its definition [4, p. 116] . As there is a one-to-one correspondence between coordinate convex sets and coordinate-convex policies, from now on we use the symbol 0 to denote either a coordinate-convex set or where (3)
For linearly-constrained feasibility regions OFR, [1] de scribes structural properties of the coordinate-convex policies maximizing the objective (1) (e.g., the existence of one vertical threshold, one horizontal threshold, or both kinds of thresh olds), which depend on the value assumed by the revenue ratio R:= r2/rl .
III. MAIN RESULTS
In our analysis, we allow the feasibility region OFR to have a nonlinear upper boundary, denoted by (80FR)+ (see Figure  1 A nonempty set S-C OFR is incrementally removable with respect to 0 (fRo) if and only if S-c 0 and 0 \ S-is still a coordinate-convex set; a nonempty set S+ C OFR is incrementally admissible with respect to 0 (fAo) if and only if s+ nO = 0 and OUS+ is still a coordinate convex set.
In the following, we shall sometimes use the term "comer point" to refer to either a type-l or a type-2 comer point. By the coordinate-convexity of 0, no two comer points can be on the same vertical or horizontal line.
We recall from [1] that the definition of the objective J( . ) in (1) can be extended consistently to all (not necessarily coordinate-convex) sets S � OFR in the following way:
a coordinate-convex policy. with The objective to be maximized by the CAC system in the space P(OFR) of coordinate-convex subsets of OFR is given
nEO where r is a 2-dimensional vector whose component rk represents the instantaneous positive revenue generated by any accepted connection of class k that is still in progress and Po (n) is the steady-state probability that the CAC system is in state n. As 0 is coordinate-convex, Po ( n) takes on the product-form expression
We also recall that, for a rectangular region S := {a, a + 1, ... , b} x {c, c + 1, ... ,d}, by (3), (5), and (6) it follows
where (8) A. General structural properties of the optimal coordinate convex policies Let n° denote any optimal coordinate-convex policy (or its associated coordinate-convex set). Proposition 111. 3, which extends to nonlinearly-constrained feasibility regions a similar property stated in [1, Theorem 1] for linearly-constrained ones, states that the comer points of n° are to be searched among the vertices of a suitable grid (see Figure 2) . We use the following notations:
lp(n2):= max{h E No such that (h,n2) En}.
(10)
The values If(n2) and l�(n1) are, respectively, the maximum number of type-lltype-2 connections allowed in n when we have already n2 type-2/n1 type-l connections. It follows from the definitions that the functions lP ( . ) are non increasing. Set 
(ii) If (0, /3) is a type-l corner point for n°, then for some j = 1, ... , n1 , max we get
We refer to the reader to [14] for other general structural properties of the optimal coordinate-convex policies, not de pending on the revenue ratio R. is not true that j -=I-k implies lPPR (j) -=I-lPPR (k). As shown in Figure 2 , in general for every j2 E {O, ... ,n2 , max} there exist j( 2 , l) :::; j2 and j( 2 , u) 2: j2 such that lPP R ( -) is constant on the { ' ( 2 1 ) ' ( 2 u)} C {O } S' '1 I � set ) , , ... ,)' _ , ... ,n2 , max ' Iml ar y, lor every . {O } h . ' ( 1 I ) <. d ' ( 1 u) > . ) 1 E , ... ,n1 , max t ere eXist) , _ ) 1 an ) ' _ ) 1 such that l�PR ( -) is constant on the set {j( l, I ), ... ,j( l, u)} � {O n } Let B '-max{) ' ( l, u) -) ' ( 1 , 1 ) ' ) ' -, ... , 1 , max .
1 .-. 1 -O n } and B . -max{) ' ( 2 , u) ) · ( 2 , l) . ) · -, ... , 1 , max 2 .--. 2 -0, ... ,n2 , max}, Recall that R := T2/T1 is the revenue ratio. The following theorem states that under suitable conditions one has threshold-type optimal policies. The result is an extension of [1, Theorem 1] to feasibility regions with a nonlinear upper boundary. Its proof exploits Proposition III.5. 
then no is threshold type-I , and the threshold is equal to ll l pR( ' )fi ' -0 some 1 ) or some) -, ... , n 2 , max '
(ii) If R < L2, where
then n° is threshold type-2, and the threshold is equal to some l�FR (j) for some j = 0, ... , n l, max.
(iii) If 1, < R < L2, then no = nFR·
The following corollary provides sufficient conditions for threshold-type optimal policies.
Corollary 111.7. Let Ai(· ) be nonincreasing for i = 1,2.
(i) If R > X l (0, Bd, then no is threshold type-I , and the threshold is equal to some lPFR(j) for some j = 0, ... , n2 , max.
(ii) If -k > X2(O, B2), then no is threshold type-2, and the threshold is equal to some l�FR(j) for some j = 0, ... , n l, max. 
IV. SIMUL ATION RESULTS
In the next numerical results we show that, under the conditions of Corollary 111. 7 (i) and (ii) resp., the optimal threshold for threshold type-1 policies is indeed equal to lPFR (j) for some j = 0, ... , n2 , max, and the optimal threshold for threshold type-2 policies is equal to l�FR(j) for some j = 0, ... , n l, max. In Figure 3 the feasibility region used to make these simulations is depicted. We assume homogeneous Poisson arrivals for both classes.
With this feasibility region we have B l = 16 and B2 = 10;
for Al = 50, A2 = 150, J.l l = 0. 5, J.l2 = 5, r l = 0.25, and r2 = 2.5 we have R = r2/r l = 10 and X l (0, 10) '::: : 9. 89. Then R > x l (O,B l ) and by Corollary 111. 7 (i) there exists an optimal coordinate-convex policy that is threshold type-I. According to Corollary 111. 7 (i), the optimal threshold belongs to the set {O, 15,22, 28}. Figure 3 (b) shows that this is indeed the case, and that the optimal threshold is t l = 15. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
This paper provides several structural properties of the comer points of the optimal coordinate-convex policies in CAC problems with nonlinearly-constrained feasibility regions and two classes of users. These properties can be used to narrow the search for the optimal coordinate-convex policies. For certain feasibility regions characterized by a nonlinear constraint of the form L kEK 13k (nk) :::; C, the simplest possible extension of the results to more than 2 classes of users consists in defining subproblems obtained by partitioning the set of classes by using subsets of cardinality at most 2 and applying to each subproblem the results obtained here for 2 classes of users.
VI. PROOFS
Due to the page limits, we refer the reader to [1] for the statements of [1, Lemmas 1-3], which are used in some of the following proofs. An inspection of the proofs of [1, Lemmas 1-3] shows that they hold for both linearly-constrained and nonlinearly-constrained feasibility regions.
Proof of Proposition III.3. We prove only (i), since (ii) can be obtained in the same way by exchanging the roles of the two classes of users. Suppose that (11) is violated for every j = 1, ... , n2 , max. Choosing n = l¥ o (a -1) -13 � 0, S-(n) = {(a-1,f3+i) : i = 0, ... , n} � n°, and S+(n) = {(a,f3+i) : i = 0, ... , n} � nF R \ n° (see Figure 4) , it follows that the sets n° \ S-(n) and n° u S+ (n) are coordinate-convex, so S-(n) is lRo o and S+(n) is lAo o . By formula (7), we get J(S-(n)) = r l (a -1)+r2x2(f3,f3+n) < r l a+r2x2(f3,f3+ n) = J(S+(n)), but this contradicts the optimality condition stated in [1, Lemma 2] , so one concludes that there exists some j = 1, ... , n2 , max such that (11) holds.
• Proof of Proposition 111.5.
Given a type-2 comer point (a, 13), we know from Proposition 111. 3 (i) that a = lPFR (j) + 1 for some j = I, ... , n2 , max. Choosing n = l¥ o (a -I) -13 � 0, m = min{(l�FR(a) -f3),n}, S -(n) = {lPFR(j( 2 , U) +1)+ l, ... ,lpFR(j( 2 , u))} x ff3, ... ,f3+n} � n°, and S +(m) = {lpFR(j ( 2 , 1 ) )+l, ... ,l p FR(j( 2 , 1 ) -I)} x { f3, ... ,f3+m} � nF R \ n° (see Figure 5) , it follows that the sets n° \ S -(n) ·........
S-(n)
::; i S+(n) (ii) is proved similarly.
(iii) If 1, < R < L2, then by parts (i) and (ii) DO is both threshold type-1 and threshold type-2, so it coincides with
D FR·
Proof of Corollary III.7. For each j follows from the definitions of X2(',') that
• 0, ... ,n1 , max, it and of j( l, l), j( l, u) x2(l�FR(j ( 1 , 1 ) ) + I, l�FR(j( l, l) -1)) � l�FR(j( l, l) ) + 1, X2(l�FR(j ( 1 , u) + 1) + I, l�FR(j ( l, u) )) � l�FR(j( l, u) ), and l�FR(j( l, u)) = l�FR(j( l, l)), so L1 � X l( O l , B ' ) ' Similarly, we have L2 � X 2 ( O l , B 2 ) '
•
